

# MISSING PAGE


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
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**Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel  
Tuesday - 12 September 1961**


**Page 1**



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13. (Internal Use Only - JOC) Met briefly with Alfred Nittle, HCUA, to pick up a book written by [redacted] who has been cooperating with the Committee, is suffering from ulcers and is badly in need of employment. Nittle indicated further that they feel the matter of finding employment for him is a Committee responsibility.

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**SIGNED**  
**JOHN F. WARNER**  
**Legislative Counsel**

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cc: IG  
DD/S  
Colonel  
Rem 13 - [redacted]

**SECRET**

CIA

W-4910

STAT

The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

In view of your great concern over future facets of the cold war and because of your great interest in unorthodox and intelligence operations as a means of combatting further encroachment of the Free World, I believe that the enclosed articles which recently appeared in the "Hartford (Connecticut) Courant" might be of some interest to you, inasmuch as they provide the background for some rather important intelligence operations conducted under the stewardship of General William J. Donovan during World War II.

The success attained in World War II by these clandestine operations is well known to Ambassador Bruce and Secretary Goldberg.

Respectfully,

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Town News — Classified  
Editorial — Theaters  
Farm and Grange  
Travel—Resorts

# The Hartford Courant

SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 1961

Part  
IB

America's Intelligence Dilemma: Part II

## Ex-OSS Officer Puts Blame for U.S. Failures on CIA

Sees Need  
For Change  
As Critical  
Fears Ineptness  
Security Threat

By MAJ. MAX CORVO

(This is the last of a series of two articles in which Maj. Corvo, Middletown newspaper editor who was chief of secret intelligence forces in Italy during World War II, evaluates the record of the CIA in the light of wartime experience of the OSS. Maj. Corvo, cited by the Army as the originator of a force to work secretly behind enemy lines, served directly under Maj. Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, chief of the OSS.)

The end of World War II raised the curtain on an era of half-peace-half-war, and set the stage for the most titanic struggle of political philosophies that has ever visited the earth.

The hardships and privations of World War II struck a sympathetic chord in the heart of America, which generously responded to the needs of the world in an outpouring of food, goods and money for the less fortunate nations.

This generosity was neither tempered nor premeditated — it aimed solely at helping those nations who through the war years had been visited by untold suffering, privation and destruction.

The era of good feeling was still young, for the war was hardly over when the Soviets began to lower a curtain of suspicion and hate upon nations still nursing their wounds from the conflict against Nazism.

Unprepared to meet with a philosophy of mass cunning, deceit and clandestine manipulation the West had already lost the first phase of the struggle when the Baltic, Central Europe and the Balkans had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

New at the helm as freedom's spokesman, the United States faltered in indecision, post-war readjustment and futile efforts to arbitrate, while in the East the



UPRISING: Photo taken during World War II shows Italian patriots at height of uprising against German and Fascist forces. With OSS guidance, the civilian fighters were able to

Allen W. Dulles as deputy director of the organization.

With the election of Gen. Eisenhower as President, Gen. Smith was moved to the post of Undersecretary of State, while Allen Dulles assumed the top command of the CIA.

Many Protest Dulles

The emergence of Allen Dulles to the sensitive, near-cabinet post brought protests from persons interested in policy matters. These persons felt that no two brothers should be placed in a position where the orthodox and unorthodox policies of the nation were being handled by members of the same family. Eisenhower brushed aside the protests, and the stage was set for the most calamitous series of setbacks to this nation's foreign policy and prestige.

While it was true that Allen Dulles headed the OSS desk in it permitted the light of the U.S. to be shed on the dark side of the world. It must be conceded that this was a record of failures, but despite this the Dulles "stevedore" of the CIA has been successful in originating and implementing the own versions of U.S. foreign policy — often with disastrous consequences to our national prestige.

It has also been eminently successful in enlisting the support of the Executive Branch of Government in order to cover its tracks from Congressional scrutiny.

dial plan in South East Asia to take advantage of the uprising in Poland and on October of that same year it stood helplessly by and watched the slaughter of the Hungarian people.

It was caught short on October 4, 1957, when the Soviets launched their first Sputnik. In 1958 it gave no alert on the military uprising in Algeria and even less warning on the murder of pro-Western King Feissal of Iraq.

It compounded many errors in neglect in recent times. One of the glaring shortcomings is the stop-gap nature of our national policies which have often been adopted under constant communist pressures and have prevented the formulation of long-range plans, thus forcing Washington to create a number of mushrooming agencies which have:

a) Expanded beyond their assigned missions.  
b) Sown the seeds of administrative confusion.  
c) Arrogated the powers of other agencies.

Unless a trim-back of personnel is effected, and lines of administrative authority are unscrambled, it will be next to impossible to create the governmental or-

strike at hundreds of strategic points, take control of wide areas and demoralize the Nazi Wehrmacht. In 1941, American intelligence agents failed to bring similar results in Cuba.

The Kennedy administration's reappraisal of the U.S. intelligence and special operations apparatus is long overdue, but even now it is not too late to clear the decks for a dynamic program which, if properly formulated, can stop Communist encroachment dead on its tracks.

Reappraisal Overdue

Such a reappraisal cannot overlook other basic shortcomings which have materially contributed to the various costly failures that have plagued our government in recent times. One of the glaring shortcomings is the stop-gap nature of our national policies which have often been adopted under constant communist pressures and have prevented the formulation of long-range plans, thus forcing Washington to create a number of mushrooming agencies which have:

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Ill-prepared to just with a philosophy of mass cunning, deception and clandestine infiltration, the West had already lost the first phase of the struggle when the Baltic, Central Europe and the Balkans had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

New at the helm as freedom's spokesman, the United States wallowed in indecision, post-war readjustment, and futile efforts at arbitration, while in the East the Chinese Communists, with Stalin's help, took over the ancient land to lower yet another curtain against the West.

**New Tactics Needed**  
It was obvious from the very beginning that if the Western way of life was to survive, our nation, as its leader, must adopt new tactics and that instead of waiting for events to happen, it must develop, once again, the ability to anticipate accurately the moves of the Communist world and then act with decision and conviction.

Accordingly, in 1947, Congress authorized the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, an executive organization which was to act as the eyes and ears of the free world in all corners of the globe.

Based on Gen. Donovan's recommendations, CIG, as it was first known, was activated by President Truman who placed Gen. Lloyd S. Vandenberg as its first director. Vandenberg was, however, awaiting assignment as Air Force Chief of Staff, and his assignment to the intelligence organization was simply a lay-over appointment.

Personnel for the organization was drawn chiefly from OSS left-overs who envisaged a long career service with fat pensions at the end of the rainbow.

Vandenberg was succeeded by Adm. Roscoe Hickenkoetter, whose stay at Central Intelligence was ineffectual, except that during his term of office the Communists triggered the invasion of South Korea.

**CIA Caught Short**

Ill-prepared and caught short by the sudden onslaught of the North Korean forces, CIA was not able to forewarn our government of the impending invasion. The situation was further complicated when the Chinese Red Vol. untiers swarmed across the Yalu without warning and caused one of the tragic retreats of American armed forces.

Adm. Hickenkoetter went back to sea, and on Aug. 18, 1950, not properly function. In this it President Truman called upon Gen. Walter Bedell Smith to take over the organization.

Over the organization, Smith, who was then in command of the First Army with headquarters on Governors Island, New York, was reluctant to take the assignment. After a number of meetings and a little prodding, he was prevailed upon to accept the responsibility. Soon after taking over as director, Gen. Smith appointed

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE <i>Cuba</i>
TO: <i>Lawrence Houston</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>221</i>	BUILDING <i>East</i>	
REMARKS:  <i>No action being taken on this</i>  <i>Hbl</i> <i>g/p</i>		
FROM: <i>W. L. Pforzheimer</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>1348</i>	BUILDING <i>M</i>	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		
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